We analyze whether voters value local political representation by exploiting municipal mergers, which increase the number of candidates available to voters and intensify political competition. In the Finnish open-list proportional representation system, voters rank the candidates within parties, and thus, concentrating votes to local candidates increases the extent of local representation. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the vote distributions become more concentrated in municipalities less likely to gain local representation after the mergers. Moreover, the effect is much larger in municipalities where the benefits of local representation to voters are large. The latter result disentangles voters' responses from the responses of other political actors. The results are important also for designing local government mergers, which are an important policy tool in many countries. They highlight that concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers have merit, because voters have preferences for local representation. At the same time, the vote concentration patterns we find alleviate these concerns.
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Introduction
Received literature in both economics and political science shows that representation in a legislative body matters for the geographic distribution of centralized spending and the type of public spending in general. 1 Representation should be important also at the local level. If households sort into local communities based on their preferences concerning local public goods as suggested by Tiebout (1956) , a local candidate is likely to share voters' preferences over the service-tax bundle that the local public sector offers. In addition, voters' preferences are likely to be heterogeneous with respect to the geographic location of the services. Moreover, local governments cater to these heterogeneous preferences from a common pool of funds, which implies that voters need a local representative to ensure their own share of the spending (Weingast et al. 1981) and to prevent others from spending too much (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) .
In this paper, we analyze whether voters value local political representation by studying how voters in municipal council elections reacted to a recent wave of municipality mergers in Finland. 2 Here local representation refers to the candidates residing in the voters' pre-merger municipalities who are elected to the post-merger municipal council. Using the terminology coined by Duverger (1954) , a municipal merger can be seen as an electoral boundary reform that results in both mechanical and psychological effects. The mechanical effects of a merger result from the way it changes the set of voters that are able to vote for a given candidate, the set of candidates competing against each other and the number of seats over which they compete. The 2 mechanical effects are likely to lead to psychological effects, i.e. behavioral responses by political actors.
For our purposes, the essential feature of the Finnish local election system is that each voter casts a single vote to a single candidate meaning that voters (not parties) decide which candidates are elected from a given list. Therefore, votes contain information on voter preferences over individual candidates.
From the voters' point of view, the electoral boundary reforms have two major components. First, a merger can be seen as an expansion of the voters' choice set, because in the merged municipalities voters can also vote for new non-local candidates. If the location of candidates is not relevant to voters, at least some voters should find a better match from the new larger set of alternatives. If so, the vote distribution of a municipality (when measured at the pre-merger level)
should be less concentrated after a merger as votes are scattered to a larger number of candidates. If, however, voters prefer local over non-local candidates, they should keep on voting them regardless of the new choices available. This, in turn, should result either in no change or in a more concentrated vote distribution depending on the number of local candidates in the post-merger elections. According to a standard revealed preference argument, if we observe a voter choosing a local candidate over a non-local candidate when both are available, this choice reveals a preference for local over non-local candidates.
Second, by increasing political competition, a merger profoundly affects the extent of local representation, i.e. the expected number of representatives from voters' pre-merger municipalities in the post-merger municipal council. If voters value local representation and act strategically, i.e. take into account election probabilities, voters should concentrate votes to those local candidates that have a genuine chance of winning a seat from a non-local candidate. This means that vote concentration should increase with the strategic incentives.
The boundary reforms naturally facilitate a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis where the unit of observation is the pre-merger municipality and voting data come from elections before (2004 elections) and after (2008 elections) the merger wave. The key aspect of our analysis is that we can decompose a merged municipality into the original pre-merger municipalities and trace back the vote distributions of individual candidates at the pre-merger municipal level both before and after the mergers. Furthermore, using the prereform vote distributions and the post-merger municipalities as new electoral districts, we can calculate counterfactual election outcomes that measure the mechanical effects of the mergers on local representation, i.e. the expected electoral success of local candidates. Our interest lies on the voters' psychological response to these mechanical effects.
We find that the vote distributions of the merged municipalities are clearly more concentrated in the post-merger elections than before, whereas there is no change among the municipalities that did not merge. More importantly, however, the concentration effect is clearly larger in municipalities with higher treatment intensity. 3 In fact, we find no vote concentration among the merged municipalities that did not expect to lose representation (typically large municipalities merging with smaller partners), but find substantial vote concentration among municipalities that did expect a substantial loss (typically small municipalities merging with larger partners). This happened despite the fact that the voters in these municipalities had a much larger set of candidates and parties to choose from after a merger. We report the same patterns in overall vote distributions and the vote distributions over local candidates.
We also analyze whether the voters' response is larger in municipalities where the benefits of gaining local representation are larger. For example, losing local services, such as day care centers or schools, has more negative consequences in the localities farther away from the new location of these services (typically the new municipal center) due to increase in travel costs. Our 3 The mergers were decided voluntarily at the local level and are a non-randomly selected sample both from the perspective of the merger decision and the intensity of the treatment. Reassuringly, our DID design is valid in the light of common pre-trend tests (both the merger decision and merger subgroups with different treatment intensity), alternative control group (municipalities that considered merging, but eventually did not) and controlling for observables.
4 main finding in this respect is that the effect of our treatment on vote concentration increases substantially both as the geographic distance of voters'
to the center of the new municipality (the largest municipality in a merger) and income heterogeneity between merging municipalities increase. The first result suggests that voters care about the geographic location of public services, and the second, that there is between municipality preference heterogeneity over services in accordance with Tiebout (1956) sorting. Overall, our findings show that voters value local representation so that the geographic location is an important attribute of a candidate. Our findings are also consistent with strategic voting in order to increase local representation.
The question remains whether we can attribute the changes in vote distributions to voter behavior instead the behavior of other political actors.
Overall, the reform had a large effect on the set of available candidates both in terms of quantity and quality. However, we show that these party and candidate responses are not related to the preference heterogeneity measures that are important to voters. This observation is crucial and allows us to disentangle voters' behavioral responses from the confounding responses of other political actors. We also discuss at length why alternative explanations, such as campaigning, changes in voter preferences, voters rewarding for merger decisions or information advantages of local candidates, are unlikely to explain our findings.
Finally, it is interesting to note that voters were quite successful in their efforts. In our data, 20 out of the 120 merged municipalities would not have gained any representation into the post-merger council in our counterfactual elections. In reality, these municipalities gained on average almost three representatives (maximum of 7) and only one of these municipalities failed to gain a single one.
Our findings show that concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers are important because of preferences for local representation, but the 5 vote concentration we report alleviates these concerns. 4 This result is of substantial interest since municipal mergers have been an important policy tool in many countries. Major merger reforms have been implemented over time in a number of countries including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland (Dafflon 2012; Blom-Hansen et al. 2014; Hinnerich 2009; Reingewertz 2012; Weese 2015) . However, the political effects of these reforms have been largely neglected in the prior literature. These arguments apply also to mergers of other local jurisdictions, such as school districts (Gordon and Knight 2009 ).
Our results fill a clear gap in the literature, because, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to offer evidence concerning voter preferences for local representation using actual voting data from a natural experiment. 5 We also contribute to the small, but growing literature that tests strategic voting using natural experiments by analyzing voter behavior in a novel context.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the institutional framework. In Section 3, we describe the boundary reforms in more detail. We present our econometric approach in Section 4 and the results in Section 5. The first part of Section 5 describes how the voters' choice set changes due to the boundary reforms and the second part analyzes voters' behavior. Section 6 concludes. 4 For a more detailed discussion on jurisdiction size and democracy, see Verba and Nie (1972) , Dahl and Tufte (1973) , Treisman (2011) and Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) . 5 Prior research typically resorts to surveys when measuring voter preferences, which brings about its own complications on the appropriate survey design (see e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2008) , and issues that survey results are often highly responsive to seemingly trivial changes in the questionnaire or survey timing (Zaller and Feldman 1992) . Shugart et al. (2005) offer complementary, but indirect evidence that voters use candidate's locality as an informational cue, whereas Nemoto and Shugart (2013) use evidence from a natural experiment to study how localism affects parties' strategic choices in candidate placement. 6 A substantial literature studies the extent of strategic voting using survey data (e.g. Blais et al. 2001; Blais et al. 2005; Abramson et al. 2010) . However, the results vary depending on the survey design (Alvarez and Nagler 2000) . Studies using actual election data usually report substantial strategic voting (e.g. Cox 1997; Fujiwara 2011; Lago 2012; Kawai and Watanabe 2013; Spenkuch 2014 
Institutional background
In Finland, public goods and services are provided by two tiers of government where municipalities constitute the local level. Municipalities are of considerable importance to the whole economy as they employ around 20 percent of the total workforce. The bulk of municipalities' expenditures come from producing social and health care services and primary education. In most of these services, the geographic location of services is relevant for the citizens. Our focus is not on the reasons behind this recent merger wave. In public discussion, the merger wave is often seen as a result of increasing fiscal pressure due to differences in population trends and aging across municipalities making it difficult for small and poor municipalities to cope with their responsibilities. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) describe the determinants of these mergers and find evidence suggesting that fiscal pressure, voter preferences and local democracy considerations influence the merger decisions. Hyytinen et al. (2014) 
Mergers as electoral boundary reforms
Mergers like all electoral reforms bring about both mechanical and psychological effects. Since our focus is on local representation, the mechanical effect of interest refers to the way the reform changes the extent of representation from the perspective of the pre-merger municipalities. 
Econometric analysis
Data
Our main data source is the election database maintained by the Ministry of Justice. These data include information on votes received by individual candidates from two municipal elections held in October of 2004 and 2008. 10 We have augmented the data with a rich set of candidate characteristics, including their addresses. These data were obtained from The Local Government Pensions Institution (KEVA), Statistics Finland, The Finnish Tax Authority and The Population Register Centre. In addition to election data, we use municipal characteristic to study whether voters' reactions are heterogeneous with respect to differences among merging municipalities. These data were obtained from Statistics Finland.
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The 2008 municipal elections were held using the new merged municipalities as constituencies.
12 Municipalities are divided into polling districts, which simply define the location where people go to vote. The election data is registered and publicly available at the polling district and candidate level (also votes given in advance are registered to the correct polling districts).
Since these polling districts do not change because of the mergers, we know the location of voters also after the mergers and can build a balanced panel data set where the cross-sectional units are the municipalities in 2004, i.e. before the mergers. 
Descriptive statistics
We start the empirical analysis by reporting descriptive statistics on the Seatloss measure and trends in the pre-merger municipal level vote distributions. In The mechanical effects of the reform in terms of local representation are substantial. The municipalities in the weak incentives group would get, on average, about 80 percent of the council seats while this share is less than 2 percent for the municipalities in the strong incentives group. In fact, half of the 40 municipalities in the strong incentives group would gain no representatives into the post-merger council, if the candidates and voters behaved exactly as they did in the pre-merger elections. From Table 1 , we also see that the municipalities in the strong incentives group are small and part of relatively large mergers, both in terms of overall merger population and the number of participating municipalities. Table 1 also includes a large number of municipality characteristics that will be used in robustness checks. 16 In Figure A2 in the Appendix, we repeat this analysis using an alternative control group consisting of municipalities that did not merge, but voted for a merger between the 2004 and 2008 elections. The pre-treatment trend is very similar and there is no significant jump in the measures of the alternative control group. 14 strategically to the mechanical effects of the reform. This is why, in the next section, we analyze the role of each political actor in more detail. 
Econometric models
To analyze how different political actors respond to the mechanical effects of the reform, we study a variety of outcomes in a continuous treatment DID framework. Our first model specification can be written as 
where the Heterogeneity measure depends on model specification.
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We measure preference heterogeneity using five variables. First, if councilors and voters consume services in the same location, a councilor living close to a voter is likely to share the voter's preferences over the geographic location of public services (elementary schools, health care facilities etc.). 19 It is plausible to assume that after a merger there is pressure to concentrate at least some services to the business center of the largest municipality of a merger.
Thus, the farther away the voters are from the business center of the largest 17 For example, an increase in jurisdiction size may have a direct effect on voters' behavior as suggested by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) . Alternatively, we can run these regressions using only the municipalities that merged. The results are largely the same with these approaches (not reported for brevity, but available from authors). 18 The underlying assumption in this specification is that preference heterogeneity only plays a role when there are strategic incentives for vote concentration. This assumption is not driving the results, because the results are robust to fully saturating the model with all the baselines and the interactions concerning the heterogeneity measures (i.e. Heterogeneity and Heterogeneity*After).
19 House values are tied to the quality of public services in the neighborhood and may be an incentive device that also aligns councilors ' and voters' preferences (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999) .
16 municipality in the merger the stronger incentives they should have to concentrate votes and increase local representation. To measure these incentives, we calculated for each merged municipality the median Euclidian distance of all eligible voters to the business centers of their own pre-merger municipality and the largest municipality in their merger. 20 Our Distance measure is the difference of these median distances. It is equal to zero for the largest municipalities in each merger and for the municipalities that did not merge. Note also, that this measure can be negative in some rare cases, depending on the location of voters and the new municipality center. respectively. Thus, these heterogeneity variables measure the difference between the pre-merger municipality and the consequent merger.
All of these measures are calculated using 2006 data. Of course, these measures are highly correlated so we include each heterogeneity measure separately in order to mitigate multicollinearity problems. Descriptive statistics of our heterogeneity measures are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
To fix ideas on how to interpret Eq. (3) Table 3 repeats the analyses of Table 2 , but now we allow for treatment effect heterogeneity. Again, in Table 5 we allow for treatment effect heterogeneity. The quality of candidates that become available in the relatively small municipalities from the larger municipalities due to the reform seems to depend on distance and 23 income difference. For example, the municipalities that are far away from the largest municipality in a merger have fewer highly educated candidates than their larger neighbors (column [11] ). However, again the changes in the quality of local candidates are not related to the heterogeneity measures (Panels B, D and F). Results based on additional candidate quality measures are the same (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 
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There are three important takeaways from this section. First, the boundary reforms dramatically change the choice set that voters' in the merging municipalities face. In relatively small municipalities, the choice set in terms of number of overall candidates and parties increases substantially, but the number of local candidates decreases.
Second, the quality of both overall and local candidates changes Finally, it is equally important to note that the changes in the number and quality of local candidates are not related to any of the preference heterogeneity measures (Tables 3 and 5 ). This means that parties and candidates respond to the mechanical effects (Seatloss) , but the responses do not depend on meaningful measures of voter preferences for local representation. This finding plays a crucial role in our subsequent analysis of vote concentration.
Vote concentration
When analyzing voter responses, we study separately the vote concentration within three different candidate groups. First, as in Figure 1 , we use the overall vote distribution where the votes can cross old municipality boundaries after a merger. Second, we use the vote distribution to all local candidates. From these vote distributions we have omitted any votes that cross pre-merger municipality boundaries. Finally, we use a set of local re-runners. These are the subset of candidates that ran in both 2004 and 2008 elections, and in both election years lived in the same pre-merger municipality of interest. Thus, in this case for each pre-merger municipality, the set of candidates in the analysis is exactly the same in both years. Also for this sample, we omit all the votes that cross premerger municipality boundaries.
First we aim to understand whether voters prefer local candidates by looking at how many votes are given overall and how many to local candidates.
In Table 6 , we report the effects of the reform on the log of total amount of votes for the three different candidate groups. The log-specification is preferable, because of the huge variation in municipal population (minimum is 249 and maximum 564,521). First, we see that overall the total number of votes (roughly turnout) decreases in the relatively small municipalities, although the decrease is not statistically significant. 24 Second, the lower turnout due to the mergers in the relatively small municipalities is also reflected in how many votes in total are given to local candidates (column [2] ). This means that some voters do find better matches from the merger partners and vote across (old) municipal boundaries. However, the group of local re-runners received more votes despite the substantial decrease in overall turnout. These results are in line both with detrimental effect of larger jurisdiction on political activity and with voters having preferences for local representation. In Table 7 , we again allow for treatment effect heterogeneity in the (log) total number of votes. The table shows, that the effects of the reform on the total number of votes are not related to any of our heterogeneity measures in any of the candidate groups. Table 9 presents the treatment effect heterogeneity results based on Eq.
(3). We draw three insights from Table 9 . First, vote concentration increases as the median change in the voters' distance to municipality center increases. This effect is also very large: an additional 10 km in distance increases the maximum vote share by roughly 5 percentage points (column [1] ). In other words, each additional 10 km roughly doubles the maximum vote share from its baseline.
Notice also that when Distance is close to zero there is no vote concentration, even in municipalities with high values of Seatloss. This suggests that voters in these municipalities have no need to act strategically because their distance to local services is unlikely to increase after the merger.
Second, concentration increases with income differences and also this effect is quantitatively large. At a given level of Seatloss, a one standard deviation (1,085 Euros) increase in the income difference increases the maximum vote share by 3.5 percentage points, again a substantial increase from the baseline. The same patterns emerge when the Herfindahl index is used as the outcome.
Finally, we find no heterogeneity in the treatment effect with respect to our direct policy measures (party, tax rate and per capita expenditures). The results are again very similar when using the outcomes calculated based on subsets of local candidates (Panels C through F). Together these results suggest that voters care about the geographic location of public services and that there is between municipality preference heterogeneity over services. 26 Of course, remotely situated small municipalities are, on average, poorer than their merger partners, which means that distance and income measures are correlated.
27 26 We also estimated these models using an extensive set of control variables, including municipality characteristics and mean candidate characteristics (See Table A4 in the Appendix). Adding controls does not change our results. Furthermore, because voter turnout decreased, we also estimated the vote concentration regressions using the 2004 number of total votes when calculating candidates' vote shares. Reassuringly, the results remain the same (not reported here for brevity, but available from authors). 27 When we include both distance and income into the same regression the coefficient on income (Seatloss*Income*After) goes effectively to zero, but the coefficient on distance (Seatloss*Distance*After) diminishes only slightly. The p-value for distance in this regression is 0.065. This suggests that distance to services is the most important factor that voters care about. 
Discussion and alternative explanations
How should we interpret the results in Tables 8 and 9 against the evidence concerning the voters' choice set changes reported in Tables 2-5 ? First, we discuss voter preferences for local representation and then turn to strategic behavior.
Local representation: From Table 2 , we see that voters in relatively small merging municipalities face a much larger choice set in terms of overall number candidates and parties, but at the same time have fewer local candidates to choose from. In light of these numbers, if voters do not value local representation, we should probably observe less concentrated vote distributions after the mergers because voters are likely to find better matches from the larger number of alternatives. More concentrated vote distributions after the voters are presented with a larger choice set, as reported in Figure 1 and However, the results in Tables 3 and 5 together with Table 9 largely rule out these interpretations. From Tables 3 and 5 , we see that the changes in the number and quality of local candidates are not related to preference heterogeneity measures (especially the interaction term of distance and Seatloss after the mergers), whereas, according Table 9 , the vote concentration patters clearly are. That is, we can rule out choice set confounders in Table 9 and conclude that voters respond to strategic concentration incentives when the rewards for local representation are high.
A further argument in favor of strategic voting is that the votes are more concentrated also within the set of local re-runners. The results indicate that the voters, whose former preferred candidate no longer runs, vote popular local rerunners disproportionally relative to the candidates' popularity in the premerger elections. Alternatively, concentration among local re-runners means that some voters abandon their former candidate, even when the candidate reruns, in order to vote for a candidate with a legitimate chance of election.
Either way, this evidence is consistent with strategic voting. Third, voters may reward politicians who bring home pork by strategic overspending prior to merging, which is then funded by the new merger partners. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) show that this is indeed the case in
Finland and that such free-riding is strongly correlated with Seatloss. However, in Table A4 we report regression results where we directly control for 28 If campaigning is mostly related to conferring information on election probabilities, campaigning can be seen as a coordination device which facilitates strategic voting. 29 Moreover, previous empirical evidence suggests that it is quite difficult to influence voter behavior with campaigning (Levitt 1994; Gerber et al. 2003 and Krasno and Green 2008) .
municipal debt and spending and other characteristics and the results remain the same.
In addition, as pointed out by Kawai and Watanabe (2013) it is important to distinguish strategic voting from misaligned voting. For some strategic voters, their sincere and strategic choice may coincide. Misaligned voters are those whose strategic choice differs from their sincere choice. Our DID approach can only detect misaligned voting, because we identify changes in voting behavior due to changes in election probabilities (Seatloss) . At the same time, estimating the percentage of strategic voters is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the value of local political representation to voters by studying how voters in local municipal council elections reacted to a recent wave of municipality mergers in Finland. A municipal merger can be seen as an electoral boundary reform that expands the choice set available to voters and at the same time intensifies political competition. We find, using DID methods, that voters in merging municipalities concentrate their votes to strong local candidates compared to voters in municipalities that did not merge. Moreover, the concentration effect is clearly stronger in municipalities that were less likely to gain local representation in the post-merger councils based on counterfactual election calculations. This happened despite the fact that the voters in the merged municipalities had a much larger set of candidates and parties to choose from after a merger.
We also find that the concentration effect is larger in municipalities where the benefits of local representation to voters are large. This result allows us to disentangle voters' behavioral responses from the responses of other political actors. We interpret these results so that voters value local representation and that some voters vote strategically in order to guarantee it.
Besides providing novel evidence on both the importance of preferences for local representation and strategic voting, the results have implications for merger policy. The upside of larger municipalities is that they may internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers and facilitate exploitation of scale economies, but the downside is that they lead to an increasing mismatch of preferences and public services if there are spatial differences in voter preferences. A number of papers have shown that this type of heterogeneity is important (e.g. Alesina et al. 2004; Rodden 2010; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014) .
Our results contribute to this literature by shedding further light on the type of preference heterogeneity among voters that is relevant for merger policy and by showing that voters perceive local representation to be important in transferring these preferences into policy outcomes. Furthermore, concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers are important due to preferences for local representation, but observed vote concentration somewhat alleviates these concerns. An interesting future avenue for research would be to analyze whether local representation has an effect on the subsequent policy decisions in the merged municipalities.
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Appendix. Descriptive statistics and additional results. a Difference between the median distances of eligible voters to the center of the pre-merger municipality and the largest municipality in the merger. It equals zero for the largest municipality.
b Dummy that equals 1 if a municipality had a different largest party than the largest municipality in a merger and zero otherwise. Notes: The histograms are for the three largest parties and the Swedish People's Party, which is a large party in the municipalities with a Swedish speaking majority. 
